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Newell v. State of Nevada, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 97 (December 24, 2015)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW: USING FORCE IN RESPONSE TO THE COMMISSION OF A FELONY 
 
Summary 
 
 The holding of State v. Weddell is extended. Responding with deadly force to the 
commission of a felony per NRS § 200.160 is justified only when the person poses a threat of 
serious bodily injury. Short of such a threat, the amount of force used must be reasonable and 
necessary under the circumstances. 
 
Background 
 
 During an altercation at a gas station in 2012, Patrick Newell sprayed Theodore Bejarano 
with gasoline, lit him on fire, and threatened him with a pocketknife. Newell was charged with 
attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, battery with the use of a deadly weapon, 
attempted assault with the use of a deadly weapon2, and performance of an act in reckless 
disregard of persons or property. At trial, Newell claimed that his actions constituted justifiable 
battery because he had reasonably believed that Bejarano was committing felony coercion 
against him. However, the district court relied on State v. Weddell in issuing its final jury 
instruction. It stated that the amount of force used in a battery had to be reasonable and necessary 
under the circumstances and that deadly force could not be used unless the person battered posed 
a threat of serious bodily injury. Per the instruction, Newell was convicted of the battery, 
attempted assault, and reckless disregard charges.3 On appeal, Newell argued that the district 
court abused its discretion by giving a jury instruction that was an incorrect statement of Nevada 
law resulting in a legally impossible conviction. 
 
Discussion 
 
The district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the jury instruction. 
 
 Newell argues that the jury instruction is an abuse of discretion because the plain 
language of NRS § 200.160 does not require that the amount of force used in battery be 
reasonable and necessary or that there exist a threat of serious bodily injury to justify deadly 
force. 4  The district court has broad discretion to finalize jury instructions. 5  Whether those 
instructions are accurate statements of the law is reviewed de novo, and when the words of a 
statute are clear and unambiguous, the court will give them “their plain, ordinary meaning.”6 The 
court may look to other sources in interpreting statutes, however, if a plain meaning 
interpretation would lead to an absurd or unreasonable result.7 
                                                 
1  By Douglas H. Smith 
2  The attempted assault charge was an amendment to an earlier charge of actual assault with a deadly weapon. 
3  The reckless disregard charge was later dismissed. 
4  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.160 (2015). 
5 Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 748, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). 
6  Davis v. State, 130 Nev. Adv. Op. 16, 321 P.3d 867, 871 (2014); State v. Friend, 118 Nev. 115, 120, 40 P.3d 436, 
439 (2002). 
7  Friend, 118. Nev. at 120-121, 40 P.3d at 439. 
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The plain meaning of the justifiable battery statutes do not require that the amount of force used 
be reasonable and necessary or in response to a serious bodily injury.  
 
Per NRS § 200.275, battery is justified whenever homicide is justified.8 NRS § 200.160 
requires that, for a homicide to be justified, it must be either a response to a reasonable 
apprehension of an attempted felony or in actual resistance to an attempted felony, without 
reference to any particular type of felony.9 Thus, a plain meaning interpretation of both statutes 
would conclude that any battery is justified when someone reasonably apprehends or actually 
resists an attempted felony of any type. This interpretation is absurd and dictates an examination 
of additional sources.  
 
State v. Weddell 
 
The Weddell court held that there was no longer a compelling policy rationale for 
allowing private parties to use deadly force to apprehend felons because felonies as a class were 
no longer strictly limited to those offenses that would be punished with death upon conviction.10 
Instead, private parties apprehending felons could use force only to the degree that was 
reasonable and necessary under the circumstances and deadly force required a threat of serious 
bodily injury.11 
 
Weddell’s reasoning is applicable to our interpretation of the justifiable homicide statutes. 
 
 Since the instant case also concerns the use of deadly force against felons or those 
committing felonies without recognizing differences between violent and nonviolent felonies, the 
court accepts the Weddell rationale when using force in response to the commission of a felony. 
When reasonably apprehending an attempted felony or actually resisting an attempted felony, the 
degree of force used must be reasonable and necessary under the circumstances, and deadly force 
requires a threat of serious bodily injury.  
 
Attempted assault under NRS § 200.471(1)(a)(2) is not legally impossible. 
 
Newell was convicted of attempted assault under NRS § 200.471(1)(a)(2), which is 
defined as the “intentional placement of another person in reasonable apprehension of immediate 
bodily harm.” 12  Although the court agrees that the attempt to attempt a crime is legally 
impossible, this statutory provision is not a crime of attempt and is therefore possible.       
 
Conclusion 
 
 The district court was correct to base its justifiable battery instruction on the court’s 
holding in Weddell and thus did not abuse its discretion. Furthermore, attempted assault under 
NRS § 200.471(1)(a)(2) is legally possible. Judgment affirmed. 
                                                 
8  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.275 (2015). 
9  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.160 (2015). 
10  State v. Weddell, 118 Nev. 206, 211-212, 43 P.3d 987, 990 (2002). 
11  Id. at 214, 43 P.3d at 992. 
12  NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.471(1)(a)(2) (2015). 
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